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ORGANIZATIONAL RESISTANCE TO SERVING THE DISADVANTAGED:
THE CASE OF A STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
Ronald Randall
The University of Toledo
ABSTRACT
Maintaining the commitment of public agencies to
serve the disadvantaged persists as one of the most vex-
ing problems in public affairs. This study places in an
historical perspective the commitment of the Wisconsin
State Employment Service (WSES) to serve the disadvan-
taged during the late 1960s and the retreat from this
emphasis in the 1970s. The WSES displays a tradition of
tension between operating-level employees who aspire to
serve a job-ready clientele, and top decisionmakers who,
from time to time, sense a need for direct service to
the disadvantaged. The study suggests that effective
service to the disadvantaged depends upon continuous,
centralized contol, which is cognizant of the organiza-
tional dynamics inherent in serving this segment of so-
ciety.
INTRODUCTION
For the past 15 to 20 years, national employment and training poli-
cy-makers--in Congress, the executive branch, and in the private world
of consulting--have made effective service to the disadvantaged one of
their major goals, save for a very notable lapse during part of the
Nixon administration. This goal has been thwarted, however, by public
and quasi-public agencies at the operating level. The agencies do not
maintain service to the disadvantaged at the expected levels. Although
national policymakers have changed the employment and training system a
great deal over the past 20 years, they have not found the key to over-
coming the local obstacles to effective service to the disadvantaged.
Increasingly, one suspects that the key involves disputes over clien-
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tele. Policymakers project their enthusiasm for helping the
disadvantaged onto the employees at the operating level who must deliv-
er the services--a fatal flaw, according to this historical analysis of
the Wisconsin State Employment Service (WSES, now the Wisconsin Job
Service). This study demonstrates that operating-level employees of
one state employment service have almost continuously sought to "up-
grade" their clientele while state policymakers have periodically di-
rected a return of program emphasis to the disadvantaged.
The U.S. Department of Labor developed an interest in a comprehen-
sive state employment service policy for the disadvantaged in the early
1960s. In 1966, it made a significant commitment with a Human Re-
sources Development (HRD) policy which mandated that the local offices
of the public employment service expend their major efforts to help the
disadvantaged become job-ready and find jobs. Although the state em-
ployment services receive virtually all of their funding from the De-
partment of Labor, they retain considerable autonomy. Most state ser-
vices exercised their autonomy and resisted the HRD policy bitterly and
successfully. A few states, like Wisconsin, accepted the HRD policy
and attempted to implement it. Employer reluctance to hire the disad-
vantaged was the reason why many local offices resisted the policy. For
the employment service, employers constitute a "critical constituency
which cannot be changed" (Holden, 1966: 946). Without their good will
and job orders, the local offices make no placements. (Part of the HRD
policy was to promote employer relations and employability development
of clients.)
In 1971, the Nixon administration ended the Department of Labor's
HRD policy. The public employment service officially returned to its
labor exchange role, although many states had never left it. However,
the Department of Labor did not give up on the disadvantaged. With the
passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of
1973, the department shifted its concern for the disadvantaged to the
more than 400 prime sponsors which would be created under the act's au-
thority. Although administratively responsible to the state and local
elected officials, this extremely decentralized system of prime spon-
sors is charged with carrying out national policy. By the time CETA
came up for renewal in 1978, many observers felt that the system had
served the financial needs of mayors and city managers more than the
employment and training needs of the economically disadvantaged. One
sophisticated statistical study of CETA public service employment
(PSE) indicates that after five or six quarters, all the federally
funded PSE jobs substitute for or replace jobs funded by municipalities
(Johnson and Tomola, 1977; Nathan et. al., 1979). In the old Title II
and VI PSE portions and Title I (which was to provide employability de-
velopment to the unemployed, underemployed, and economically disadvan-
taged), CETA was serving a much smaller proportion of disadvantaged
than the law and the program requirements mandate (National Commission
for Manpower Policy, 1978: 5; Mirengoff and Rindler, 1978: 203).
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Scholar-consultants for the Department of Labor have puzzled over
the low level of services to the disadvantaged under CETA. For exam-
ple, Mirengoff and Rindler (1978: 206-12) examine several factors which
affect the choice of participants, but do not investigate the attitudes
of employment and training agency personnel toward serving the disad-
vantaged. Their recommendations would significantly increase service
to the disadvantaged only if operating personnel devote their efforts
to the disadvantaged. Carl Van Horn blames the Department of Labor and
its regional offices for the lack of attention given to the disadvan-
taged. He then concludes that "the policy of decentralizing authority
to the local level still has the potential for being the best approach
to manpower program delivery..." (Van Horn, 1978: 181). However, de-
centralization does not reconcile with the need for the Department of
Labor to direct local office personnel to increase attention to the
disadvantaged, especially if they resist serving that clientele.
In response to CETA problems, the Congress significantly centralized
the program by increasing federal controls in the 1978 renewal (P.L.
95-524). While the House committee with responsibility for the CETA
amendments avoided a direct charge of large-scale substitution by local
governments, it nevertheless "considered it essential to directly ad-
dress the problem" and took "five specific steps to control substitu-
tion" in the amendments, including limits with regard to the length of
PSE employment for individuals, wage supplements, type of employment,
etc. (U.S. Congress, 1978: 2-3). For the problem of too few disadvan-
taged in the CETA program, the 1978 renewal clearly distinguishes pro-
grams for structural unemployment from those for countercyclical unem-
ployment. Eligibility for the former (the new Title II) is limited to
the economically disadvantaged.' Eligibility for countercyclical pro-
grams include somewhat more relaxed income and employment-status cri-
teria. The first-year result of these stiffened federal requirements,
as the Department of Labor noted, is "a dramatic increase in the
1 In 1978, the formal definition of an economically disadvantaged indi-
vidual was: A person who is either (1) a member of a family that re-
ceived public assistance; (2) a member of a family whose income dur-
ing the previous 6 months on an annualized basis was such that the
family would have qualified for public assistance if it had applied
or did not exceed the poverty level or did not exceed 70 percent of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' lower living standard income level
($11,546 for a family of four in 1978); (3) a foster child on whose
behalf state or local government payments are made; or (4) a client
of a sheltered workshop, a handicapped person, a person residing in a
prison, hospital, or other institution or facility providing 24-hour
care, or a regular outpatient of a mental hospital, rehabilitation,
or similar facility, where such status presents significant barriers
to employment.
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proportion of disadvantaged persons enrolled" in the new Title II PSE
and tabular material indicates greater numbers of disadvantaged in Ti-
tle VI programs (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980: 19, 354).
Whether or not these 1978 commitments to the disadvantaged will be
sustained during the Reagan administration is problematical. On the
one hand, the Reagan administration is calling for an end to the two
PSE programs: Title lID, which primarily serves the economically disad-
vantaged and was targeted in fiscal year 1981 for 250,000 jobs at a
cost of $2.4 billion, and Title VI, the countercyclical PSE for persons
with somewhat higher incomes and less lengthy periods of unemployment
which was targeted for 200,000 unemployed persons at a cost of $2.0
billion (U.S. Executive Office of the President, 1980: 234). On the
other hand, the Reagan rationale for the CETA reduction is to eliminate
substitution and to "return CETA to its original purpose of improving
the ability of low-income persons to get jobs" (The New York Times,
Feb. 20, 1981: All-A16). This is consistent with his February 6, 1981
pledge from his address on the state of the nation that "our spending
cuts will not be at the expense of the truly needy" (The New York
Times, Feb. 6, 1981: A12). The obvious problem is that conducting em-
ployment and training programs for the truly needy without PSE places a
burden on the private sector to hire the very individuals who have
heretofore been unable to compete in the private labor market. That
burden will require a willing private sector and a commitment to serv-
ing the disadvantaged by the professionals in CETA that will be very
difficult to sustain.
A growing body of literature points to the difficulty of sustaining
employee commitment to economically disadvantaged and socially or psy-
chologically troubled clients. A study of social services for welfare
clients revealed that, contrary to professional opinion, new employees
offer more and better services to clients than those with longer ten-
ure. Veteran employees grow disenchanted or frustrated with their
work, with a consequent drop in the level of services (Randall, 1975:
197-98). Although the term was not used in that study, the behavior is
consistent with the "burn-out" syndrome which is now receiving atten-
tion among health and social services researchers.
Discussion of burn out is a sensitive matter because its causes re-
flect either on the inadequacies of the professional or the disagree-
able traits of the client. Professionals may be disinclined to accept
the stigma of the former, but to accept the latter denigrates the
clients and offends many in the helping professions. Yet it is myopic
not to regard the economically disadvantaged and the socially or psy-
chologically troubled as difficult, frustrating, and stressful individ-
uals to work with. One researcher knew that he had "touched a sensi-
tive nerve" by the volume of correspondence from practitioners to an
article he had co-authored on burn out (Warnath, 1979: 325).
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The employment service differs fundamentally from many other social
agencies in the set of responses to difficult and frustrating clients
which are available to their employees. In most health and social
agencies, the characteristic responses include: minimizing time spent
with them, frequent sick leave, increased use of alcohol, tranquilizers
and drugs (Maslach, 1976: 16-22); emotional detachment from clients,
treating them in a dehumanized way, becoming less effective on the job,
becoming more bureaucratic (Daley, 1979: 375-79); and a loss of ideal-
ism, a sense of being on an endless treadmill, and a dread of meeting
with the day's schedule of clients (Warnath and Shelton, 1976). In le-
gal services, lawyers display a high rate of turnover and many admit
that they plan to leave because they are "getting burned out" (Handler
et. al. 1978: 63-67). In the schools, increasing problems of disci-
pline, student violence, unsupportive administrators and the perception
of community disinterest in education have caused many teachers to burn
out and leave the profession. For those who stay, teaching has often
"become a matter of survival, of finding ways to prevent job stresses
from becoming unbearable" (Cerra, 1980: Bl). In the health and social
services generally, notes Maslach (1976: 20), it is "bitterly ironic
that clients should be such outcasts in a profession that would not ex-
ist without them" But the employment service is different. It can
change its clientele.
While the burn-out literature gives reason to expect employee stress
in providing employment services to the disadvantaged, there is unan-
swered in the manpower literature this fundamental question: Is there
inherent in the provision of employment and training services an inevi-
table disenchantment, frustration or distaste for serving the disadvan-
taged which causes employees to seek an upgraded clientele?
One way to answer this question is to examine historically the oper-
ations of a manpower agency which has a progressive reputation for ser-
vice to the disadvan A persistent tendency to shift service away from
the disadvantaged toward more job-ready classes in such an agency would
be strong evidence that such a tendency would be found in any employ-
ment and training agency.
THE WISCONSIN STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
WSES has long been a highly regarded agency with a reputation for
progressive administration.2 Yet, from its origins as a skeleton of a
2 Officials with long experience in the United States Employment Ser-
vice and in the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agen-
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system with four small offices, a handful of central office staff and a
budget of a few thousand dollars to its present shape of 70 local of-
fices staffed by professionals and a large, efficient central adminis-
tration, this study will show that local office employees continuously
strive to upgrade their clientele.' Only as a result of direct pressure
from state administrators do the operating-level employees provide ser-
vices to the disadvantaged. Because state policymakers only occasion-
ally returned services to the disadvantaged, the clientele has alter-
nated between the disadvantaged and the job ready. As a result, there
is frequently tension between policymakers and operating-level employ-
ees.
The Wisconsin State Employment Service was born out of a reaction to
the exploitation of the disadvantaged of the day. Before the turn of
the century, the hiring process for a significant share of the Wiscon-
sin labor force occurred in saloons. Labor agents paid saloon propri-
etors to round up workers in a process in which "the fraud and extor-
tion. . . became notorious," according to an early retrospective study
by the Wisconsin Industrial Commission (1913b: 195). Other private em-
ployment agents operated by retaining interpreters who would assemble
gangs of non-English-speaking immigrants. Agents delivered the crews
to employers for sizeable fees which were split three ways: among the
intepreters, the private agents, and the officials of the employers do-
ing the hiring (Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 1913a). The victims
of these abuses were the disadvantaged--the unskilled, often immigrant
workers, who frequently ended up in the lumber, railroad and ice camps
of the state.
cies, Inc. in Washington uniformly agree on the high quality of ad-
ministration of the Wisconsin Service. It is a reputation of long
standing in the United States. See Kellor (1915: 324) and Harrison
(1924: 209).
3 Throughout this study, attitudes and behaviors are ascribed generi-
cally to local office personnel when the actual data come from the
reports and statements of local office managers. In as much as man-
agers frequently are promoted from within and the local office is of-
ten a close-knit system of attitudes, expectations, and behaviors,
local office managers are reasonably representative of the local of-
fice personnel on matters reported in this study. Michael Lipsky's
(1973: 109) study of "street-level" bureaucrats leads him to say:
"Basic bureaucratic attitudes towards clients appear to be a function
of the worker's background and of socialization on the job (emphasis
added)."
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These abuses outraged many citizens in the state, especially after
the Panic of 1893. Until then, Wisconsin, with a very large percentage
of immigrants, contained a significant nativist sentiment to restrict
immigration and to impose limitations on immigrant voting (Thelan,
1972: 18, 87), which blocked meaningful action for the disadvantaged.
The panic of 1893, which reached depression proportions in Wisconsin,
profoundly diminished that prejudice. With poverty everywhere appar-
ent, many groups shrugged off their nativist attitudes, reduced their
moralistic crusades against alcohol, prostitution and gambling, and
concentrated their energies instead upon structural reforms which soon
flowered into Progressivism. Historian David Thelen (1972: 149-50) re-
marks upon "the enthusiasm with which workers, immigrants and Populists
contributed to the new cause" of strutural reform in the state.
4
Several unsuccessful attempts to license private employment agencies
(Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 1913b: 195) gave impetus to the ef-
forts to set up competing public employment service offices to provide
job-seekers with an alternative, non-exploitative system. The city of
Superior responded first by creating an office in 1899. With no other
cities following suit during the next two years, the state took action
in 1901 during the LaFollette administration by enacting legislation
(Laws of Wisconsin, 1901, Ch. 420) empowering the State Commissioner of
Labor to open public employment offices. A single justification domi-
nated the legislative debate over this bill--the need to curb abuses of
the disadvantaged by private employment offices and their agents
(Hurst, 1964: 480-81). Shortly after passage of the law, the commis-
sioner opened an office in Milwaukee and assumed operation of the one
in Superior.
ALTERNATING CLIENTELE
During the formative years of the Wisconsin system (1901 until the
U.S. involvement in World War I), the clientele consisted of the un-
skilled, frequently immigrant, laborers for whom the WSES had been cre-
ated. As did the private agents, the public employment service placed
many of them in railroad, lumber, and ice camps (Milwaukee Citizens'
Committee, 1931: 7). In Milwaukee, the advisory committee to the local
office reported that, from 1901 to 1911, that office served only un-
skilled occupations (Milwaukee Citizens' Committee, 1937: 5). From
1912 to 1917, common and casual placements represented 61 percent of
An increasing sympathy for the disadvantaged was just one cause of
demands for structural reform. Another was fear. For newspaper ac-
counts of tramps overruning a county, committing arson, assault and
other violence in the 1880s, see Michael Lesy (1973).
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total WSES placements, indicating a high proportion of known unskilled
placements. In addition, some unknown percentage of the remaining la-
bor placements were unskilled (Wisconsin Industrial Commission 1913b:
198; A.J. Altmeyer, 1932: 248). Clearly, the early employment service
placements served the clients for whom it was created.
Yet, local officials worked to swing the operations toward a more
skilled clientele. An experimental office for skilled workers was cre-
ated during a period of high unemployment in Milwaukee in 1911 (Milwau-
kee Citizens' Committee, 1937: 5). In 1913, the superintendent of the
Milwaukee office, which had a good national reputation (Kellogg, 1933:
30), spoke proudly of a new clientele comprised of more skilled workers
(Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 1913b: 207):
As proof of the increased efficiency of the office un-
der its reorganization, the previous tendency of the
bureau to handle only the lowest paid, most casual, the
least attractive work has been overcome to a considera-
ble extent. Employers are most ready to use the office
in filling the better class of positions and as a re-
sult the better grade of workmen become regular appli-
cants at the bureau.
To counter this propensity to seek an upgraded clientele, A.J. Alt-
meyer (1932: 264), influential advisor and longtime Secretary to the
Industrial Commission argued:
Many persons have deprecated this [that the offices
handle primarily unskilled labor], some going so far as
to say that only "bums" and "down-and-outers" patronize
the public employment offices .... The labor market for
skilled laborers is so constituted that direct methods
of bringing the man and the job together can be depend-
ed upon to a larger extent than in the case of un-
skilled labor. Therefore, the offices are probably
performing the greatest social service when they do
handle unskilled labor primarily.
Nevertheless, local offices wanted and worked for an upgraded clien-
tele. From 1917 to 1932, common and casual labor continued to account
for 61 percent of total placements (Altmeyer, 1932: 248; Wisconsin In-
dustrial Commission, Biennial Report(s), 1926-1940). But the unskilled
clientele was decreasing rapidly by the end of this period, having
dropped to 50.5 percent in 1930. In 1931, when the statewide percent-
age plunged to 42.6 percent, the Milwaukee office and the Milwaukee
Citizens' Committee on Unemployment (1931: 7) boasted of its more
skilled clientele and virtual elimination of the casual labor service:
The gradual displacement of unskilled labor by improve-
ments in the technique of industry has been of far-
reaching importance. The number of transient laborers
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handled by the office has dwindled to smaller and
smaller numbers during recent years. The employment
office is no longer able to furnish any large number of
casual labor jobs and workers of this class have turned
to institutions like the Transient Service Bureau, the
Rescue Mission, and other agencies which specialize in
caring for them.
If the Industrial Commission directed employment service offices to ca-
ter to the unskilled laborer, the Milwaukee office clearly ignored the
policy.
Labor market conditions obviously influence employment service oper-
ations. Local offices, however, retain considerable discretion in
their actual response to the conditions. Thus, the Great Depression,
which respected no class as it threw people from all walks of life out
of work, was taken as an opportunity by local office personnel to up-
grade the clientele. At its height in Wisconsin, applications for work
showed a four-fold increase over 1928, while placements suffered a 67.4
percent decline from 1929 to 1932.
The local offices seized the opportunity provided by the increased
numbers of better qualified applications. The Milwaukee office proudly
noted the development of its higher-quality clientele:
Conditions of the past few years . . . . [have] raised
the standard of the type applying. No longer is the
Public Employment Office considered a service for la-
borers only; artists and artisans, technicians and doc-
tors are numbered among those who file their applica-
tion for employment opportunities (Milwaukee Citizens'
Committee, 1935: 5).
The specific problem facing the employment service when the number
of applicants increases and job orders decrease is how to allocate the
few jobs among the many applicants. Milwaukee's solution to this prob-
lem was described by the local office (Milwaukee Citizens' Committee,
1932: 9) as follows:
The former practice of placing applicants on the basis
of fitness for the job or position had to be modified
by giving consideration to the applicant's economic ne-
cessities.
In practice, the term "economic necessities" becomes, all too easily, a
euphemism granting advantages to middle- as opposed to lower- or work-
ing-class applicants, again demonstrating the direction in which oper-
ating personnel drift.
As the United States entered World War II, President Roosevelt re-
quested that governors transfer their state employment services to the
federal government to improve the recruitment and allocation of the na-
-649-
tion's manpower. Federalization was completed by January 1, 1942. The
war forced local offices to broaden their contacts and relationships
with personnel and other management officials of most large manufactur-
ing concerns. This resulted in high placements nationally and in Wis-
consin. These high placements persisted beyond the postwar reconversion
in November, 1945, when the states resumed control over the local of-
fices.
The period 1947 to 1960 witnessed a gradual deterioration of the
prominent role achieved by the employment service during World War II.
In this period the service met with public apathy and congressional
economizing. Placements declined nationally and in Wisconsin, in part,
because of a drop in employer contacts. While total employer contacts
were decreasing, however, close examination of Wisconsin activity data
reveals that special services for favored employers increased. For ex-
ample, the number of tests administered annually by local offices (an
activity now considered employer-oriented and detrimental to minority
group interests) in each year of the 1960s was more than double the
rate of the early 1950s (Wisconsin Industrial Commission, Biennial Re-
port, 1952-1954; U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report(s),
1966-1974).
National employment-service policymakers expressed dissatisfaction
with the performance of local operations and attempted to provide more
direction from 1954 to 1958 by singling out various groups, mostly dis-
advantaged, for priority attention. These groups included the veterans
(who already had a statutory right to preferential treatment, but who
now would receive additional service), youth, the physically handicap-
ped, older workers, ex-prisoners, potential apprentices, Indians, and
members of other minority groups and professionals with the then much
heralded network of professional placement offices (Adams, 1969:
42-44). With the exception of the professionals and perhaps the veter-
ans, disadvantaged individuals comprised the bulk of the designated
groups. Top policymakers were attempting to reorient the employment
service to devote more resources to these groups. The effort failed
because the policymaking framework, which emphasized easy placements
(Haber and Kruger, 1964), remained unchanged. A bigger and bolder ef-
fort, developed within a different policymaking framework, would come
less than a decade later.
After the rediscovery of poverty in the early 1960s and a host of
anti-poverty acts, policies and programs, the national employment ser-
vice was roused to action. With a major redirection of policy in 1966,
the USES mandated Human Resources Development (HRD) for implementation
by state and local services.
Human Resources Development was designed to reach the disadvan-
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taged,s improve their employability, develop jobs for them, and place
them on those jobs. According to the Department of Labor, HRD was a
large-scale effort to shift the orientation of the public employment
service from an employer-oriented screening agency to an applicant-ori-
ented one, designed to develop the employment potential of those most
needing employment help (U.S. Department of Labor, 1967).
In order to ascertain the sentiment of local office employees to the
disadvantaged in the late 1960s, the focus shifts from the written to
the spoken word because, by then, everyone was more conscious of lan-
guage that contained words or thoughts of prejudice. Government agency
employees, among others, had "cleaned up" their written statements, re-
gardless of their attitudes. Therefore, three years after the HRD ori-
entation appeared, the author interviewed the local office managers.'
Considerable anti-HRD sentiment remained, as nine managers of the 23
interviewed (out of 24 total) expressed considerable hostility to the
new responsibilities of concentrating service on the disadvantaged.
One manager protested: "The employment service has moved into areas
where it has no business."
Without deprecating the work of employees at the operating level,
they did enjoy close, amiable relationships with employers. Several
managers unabashedly posed as spokespersons for a cherished system, ab-
solutely crucial to which are America's employers:
This is a capitalistic system--I mean that private en-
terprise is the backbone of our country and they do the
hiring of most people.
For a host of reasons, not all of which related to the effective func-
tioning of the employment service, managers such as this one wanted to
maintain those close, amiable relationships with employers. HRD, how-
ever, severely strained those relationships by forcing upon employers
the very applicants they have traditionally rejected. In objecting to
the emphasis on the disadvantaged, a manager said bluntly, "I'm employ-
er oriented: our market is the employer." A second, complaining about
state central-office controls, said: "The state does not appreciate the
The formal definition of disadvantaged in 1969 specified persons who
were poor, unemployed, or underemployed and met one of the following
criteria: (1) school dropout, (2) member of a minority, (3) under
twenty-two years of age, (4) forty-five years of age or over, or (5)
handicapped. The definition of "poor" parallels that of the United
States Social Security Administration. In 1968, for example, a non-
farm family of four was considered poor if its annual income was
$3,300 or under (U.S. Department of Labor, 1969: 1150.OIB).
For other studies using information from these interviews and explor-
ing related administrative questions, see Randall (1973 and 1976).
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fact that we have to live with employers in the area." A third opined:
Some people in the state office are not aware of the
elementary fact that the employment service has not
created one damn job. We need to pay more than lip
service to employer relations.
Managers and employees find the disadvantaged to be a difficult,
frustrating, often exasperating clientele. For example, a manager ex-
claimed that:
The people in the state office want us to serve those
who should be referred to other agencies. We are ex-
pected to serve people that Vocational Rehabilitation
has given up on!
Although the kinds of jobs often available to the disadvantagd may of-
fer little incentive for them to be good workers, their poor work hab-
its and attitudes and lack of motivation mean that a mostly middle-
class employment service prefers not to work with them. This was
certainly true of the manager who fretted that the attention given to
the disadvantaged could stigmatize the employment service:
The stronger the employment service's emphasis on the
disadvantaged and the more we impress this on employ-
ers, the greater is the risk of gaining the stigma of a
relief agency.
Racism, too, is an unspoken, but ever-present factor. For example,
one manager mentioned that some ES employees found it distasteful to
drive black disadvantaged clients to potential employers, which is of-
ten required for successful job placements.
A statistical view of WSES shows a significant response to the HRD
policy during this period. Although placements plummeted from 79,046
during the pre-HRD fiscal year 1965 to 36,308 in fiscal 1971, this was
not bothersome initially to state policymakers because of their belief
that nondisadvantaged or job-ready individuals could find work with
minimal employment service help. Testing, which is not very useful for
the disadvantaged, dropped during this period. The number of appli-
cants remained about the same, and counseling, which is a necessary em-
ployment tool for many of the disadvantaged, increased (U.S. Department
of Labor, Annual Report(s), 1966-1974).
For two years, the Nixon administration continued the HRD policy.
Then, in 1971, with placements and employer contacts still down and em-
ployee resistance to HRD persistent, the Nixon administration sounded
the official retreat from the HRD policy (U.S. Department of Labor,
1973: 13). This turnaround was confirmed by passage of the Comprehen-
sive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-203), which directed
that the employability-development functions of the U.S. manpower poli-
cy be administered by a decentralized system of prime sponsors separate
from the public employment service. The public employment service lost
-652-
its position as presumptive deliverer of manpower services and was
relegated to a simple labor exchange which could compete--if it chose--
-for subcontracts with the prime sponsor.
To implement the turnaround, the national office drastically revised
the state employment service funding arrangements by developing the
balanced placement formula (now the resource allocation formula), which
forced states to shift attention away from employability development of
the disadvantaged to straight placement activity or face the loss of
staff positions.
Wisconsin officials, who had been among the most committed of state
employment service officials to the HRD policy, were slower to respond
to the nationally mandated reversal than most states and suffered staff
losses. (Many states had failed to adopt the HRD policy in the first
place.) But the resistance of operating level personnel combined with
budgetary and other pressures from the national level led to a state
policy to return to the labor exchange role, which was clear by 1975
(Wisconsin Department of Administration, 1975; 11-151). In just under
ten years, the Wisconsin State Employment Service repeated the cycle.
CONCLUSIONS
The tension inherent between administrative and local office person-
nel throughout the history of the Wisconsin State Employment Service
helps to explain recent failures to provide adequate service to the
disadvantaged. The agency grew out of a desire to eliminate abuses
perpetrated by private agents. It was a new agency, created to serve
the disadvantaged. But throughout its history, operating-level person-
nel have endeavored to upgrade the clientele, while, from time to time,
higher level officials have attempted to redirect the efforts of the
service back to the more disadvantaged workers--those least able to
help themselves obtain jobs.
A short time perspective would make it look as if the Human Re-
sources Development policy and subsequent retreat was a unique organi-
zational phenomenon of an old-line agency, whereas in fact it repre-
.sents one cycle of a recurring phenonmenon--that of a clientele
shifting from disadvantaged to job-ready. Occasionally, higher level
officials (those who created the service originally, A.J. Altmeyer of
the Industrial Commission staff, federal officials developing the HRD
policy or state officials accepting the HRD policy) direct the service
toward the disadvantaged. Almost always, however, the operating level
staff strive to serve an upgraded clientele. Because this tension ex-
ists throughout the development of the Wisconsin State Employment Ser-
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vice, it clearly resides inherently in the employment service function
and not in the peculiar organization size or structure of a given peri-
od.
If not entirely laudable, the position of operating-level personnel
is explainable. Part of the appeal of working for the employment ser-
vice stems from the opportunity to develop contacts with community in-
fluentials--officials in area businesses. As long as the employment
service refers qualified, competent, and job-ready individuals, employ-
ers respond with job orders and amiability. However, pressing the dis-
advantaged onto employers puts a severe strain on the agency-employer
relationship, potentially depressing the number of job orders.
In addition, an emphasis on the disadvantaged forces employment ser-
vice personnel to deal with persons often frustrating and exasperating
to serve. The disadvantaged often have poor work habits and attitudes;
a short time horizon which lowers the value of training programs for
them; and physical, mental, and other disabilities which make them dif-
ficult to place. Initial enthusiasm for working with them can burn
out, yielding a calloused, bureaucratic behavior seemingly insensitive
to the real needs of the disadvantaged or an effort to upgrade the
clientele.
The lesson of this study for manpower--and for other social-policy
making and implementation for the disadvantaged--is important. Quite
simply, the realities of a federal structure for a manpower system make
permanent service to the disadvantaged extremely difficult because of
the inevitable autonomy of state agencies. Close federal-state-local
relationships, including considerable direction, control, encourage-
ment, and social support from the federal government are vital. Other-
wise, local employment and training personnel are isolated in the com-
munities, buffeted by local pressures predominantly against an emphasis
on the disadvantaged. In this environment, they naturally give expres-
sion to their own disposition to upgrade the clientele.
Against this background, the loss of federal support and tools (es-
pecially PSE) for employment and training programs for the disadvan-
taged in the Reagan administration, despite statements about the "truly
needy," leads to the observation that CETA prime sponsors will find the
temptation to upgrade their clientele nearly irresistible during the
Reagan years.
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